Abstract
Introduction
Recently, large retail companies begin to establish their own online channels and are committed to promoting the "Online-to-Offline" mode, a new marketing mode, and sets the same retail price in both online and offline channels. Many large retail giants such as Suning, Gome, two companies in China, and Wal-mart & YHD have also started constructing e-stores used to attract consumers, where the online retail price and the offline one are the same. On the other hand, electric retail giant such as T-mall, an e-commerce company in China, also begins to construct offline experience shops. Although price mechanism is still faced with some problems in practice, it has become a popular tool to coordinate the dual-channel supply chains due to the development of electronic commerce.
With the development of society and economy, E-commerce has become an important business mode for manufacturers and retailers to do their business. A supply chain in which a supply chain member (manufacturer/retailer) which simultaneously owns electronic commerce channel and traditional retail channel forms dual-channel supply chain structure. Several studies have investigated the operation of dual-channel supply chains. Choi (1996) studies price competition in a dual-channel supply chain where there exist duopoly manufacturers and duopoly common retailers. Chiang (2003) investigates a dual-channel supply chain structure which is based on utility theory and consumer demand model. Chen, et al., (2008) study a dual-channel supply chain, in which there exists service competition between direct channel and traditional channel. The supply
Basic Model
There exist one manufacturer and one offline retailer in a two-stage supply chain. The manufacturer sells its product in both offline channel and online retail channel. The retail price in online channel is the same as that in offline channel.
Notation
The notation and parameters used in the model are shown in Table 1 . 
Table1: Notation and Parameters for the Problems

The Benchmark Model
We construct a demand function concerning both online channel and offline channel： (1 )
The total profit function is determined by the following equation:
(2) We obtain the optimal solution by solving the first-order condition, i.e., 0 p    . Thus, the optimal sales price is , the optimal channel production quantities are
, and the total profit of the dual-channel supply chain is 2 12 12 [
Coordinating Dual-channel Supply Chain Under the Two-part-tariff Contract without Disruption
In the dual-channel competition mechanism, the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower of this Stackelberg game, and the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and transfer payment. The offline retailer determines product quantity and sets the sale price in the supply chain.
Based on the Stackelberg game theory, the retailer's profit function can be written as 
, and the profit of the manufacturer is
The total profit of the supply chain is 
Proof.
In the independent decision-making state without the contract, the profit function of 
The optimal wholesale price is 0 2 
Therefore, the retailer's profit in the dual-channel supply chain is
In order to achieve Pareto improvement, the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer should satisfy *0
Therefore, the range of the one-time transfer payment is
Q.E.D.
Centralized Decision with Demand Disruption
Centralized decision-making in the supply chain is to study the optimal total supply chain pricing and production plan in an integrated way. Some unexpected events occur after the manufacturer arranges production plan according to market forecast in stable state, which leads to some changes of the market scale. In the disruption model, the demand function of the supply chain is
. (4) As the result of the disruption, the manufacturer needs to increase the production quantity when , and needs to reduce the production quantity when . We assume that there is a central decision-maker who seeks to maximize the total supply chain profit after the uncertainty is resolved. The new expression for the supply chain profit function is determined by the following equation
in which
In Eq. (5), the second term on the right side of the equation is the cost associated with the increase of production quantity and the third term is the cost associated with the   , the total profit of the supply chain can be rewritten as:
   , the total profit of the supply chain can be rewritten as:
Lemma 2. Suppose that  in Eq. (5) (5), we obtain that 
.
There are two cases in this scenario, which are shown as follows: Case1:
The optimal retail price is
and the optimal production quantity is
When the disruption suddenly happens and makes the demand decrease, i.e., 0 a  , we obtain that
.. 
There are also two cases in this scenario, which are shown as follows: Case 3:
213
Similar to case2, we get: the optimal retail price is
and the optimal production quantity is 
Case 4:
Similar to case 1, we get:
the optimal retail price is
Theorem 1. Suppose that a dual-channel supply chain faces a demand function shown in Eq. (1) and the profit function under the demand disruption is shown in Eq. (5). When the demand disruption occurs, the optimal retail price is
the optimal online sales quantity is 
the optimal offline sales quantity is (1) If unexpected events make the consumer's demand increase in the dual-channel supply chain, the retail price will increase. If unexpected events make the consumer's demand decrease in the supply chain, the retail price will decrease.
(2) If the unexpected events makes the consumer's demand market scale increase greatly, i.e.,
, the manufacturer will increase the corresponding production quantity, increase the online sales price and the online sales quantity, which , in turn, will make the offline sales quantity increase.
(3) If the unexpected events makes the consumer's demand decrease greatly, i.e.,
, the manufacturer will reduce corresponding production quantity, decrease the online sales price and the online sales quantity, which, in turn, will make the offline sales quantity decrease.
(4) If the deviation of the consumer's demand is relatively small, i.e.,
, the central decision-maker needs to adjust retail price rather than the production quantity.
We will investigate the incremental improvement in the supply chain performance when there exists demand disruption in the following sections. To quantify the performance, we compare our results with the scenario in the decentralized dual-channel supply chain under the equal-retail-price mechanism.
Decentralized Decision after Demand Disruption OSccurs
In the dual-channel supply chain, double marginal effect happens when supply chain members act according to their own optimal decisions. The definition of coordination in dual-channel supply chain is that the total profit of a dual-channel supply chain in decentralized decision equals to that in centralized decision. That is to say, for a Stackelberg game in this paper, if decentralized decision in a dual-channel supply chain is made according to equal-price mechanism and the mechanism in decentralized decision makes the retail price that the retailer sets, i.e., * TP p , equal to the optimal retail price in centralized decision, i.e., * p , then the supply chain performance in decentralized decision is the same as that in centralized decision. In order to achieve Pareto improvement, the manufacturer needs to offer a one-time transfer payment T . The method is consistent with that used in stable state.
When the demand disruption occurs, the retailer's profit function is (11) and that of the wholesale price is
. (12) The profit function of the manufacturer is
For the case 1, if
the optimal wholesale price is 
the optimal wholesale price is
, and the range of the transfer payment is 2  2  2  2  *  *  2  1  2  1 2  1  2  1  2  2  1  2  1 2  1  2  2  3  2  2  2  1  2  1  2  1  2 wT . As is shown above, the two-part-tariff contract used above can coordinate the decentralized supply chain when demand disruption occurs. If the manufacturer uses the two-part-tariff policy in this paper when demand disruption happens, then the total profits in the decentralized supply chain and those in the centralized decision are shown in Table 2 . As is shown in Table 2 , the supply chain can be coordinated under the two-part-tariff contract used in this paper when demand disruption occurs.
Numerical Examples
Conclusions
This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one traditional retailer, in which the manufacturer is the leader of the Stackelberg game and sets the same retail price in the online channel as that in the offline channel. The manufacturer has its own online channel when he sells its product to the offline retailer. The optimal retail price and the sale quantity are obtained when the supply chain is in static state. Then some unexpected events make the consumer's demand change in the supply chain. We design a two-part-tariff contract with a one-time transfer payment to coordinate the supply chain under the demand disruption. The results are as follows: there exists certain robustness both in the manufacturer's production quantity and in the offline retail price when the deviation of demand is relatively small. If the change of the consumer's demand is large enough, the manufacturer needs to adjust the corresponding retail price and production quantity according to the two-part-tariff contract we design in this paper. Some numerical examples are also presented.
The disruption management in dual-channel supply chain is a meaningful and interesting field. There are still a lot of problems that need to be studied. For example, how to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain when the demand and cost disruption happens simultaneously is a very interesting question.
